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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCE 
CORPORATION, l 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DA VIS CAMPER SALES, and 
KENT MOULTON, dba SOUTH ~ 
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, a foreign corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
12266 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff against 
the defendant Kent Moulton, a licensed used motor 
vehicle dealer, and the defendant Mid-Century In-
surance Company, his bonding company, to recover 
the balance allegedly due on the sale of a used trail-
er. The action against the bonding company is 
brought under Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annotat-
ed 1953, which provides in part that applicants for 
a dealer's license shall conduct their business with-
out fraud or fraudulent representation, and Section 
41-3-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which provides 
that any person who suffers loss because of fraud or 
1 
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fraudulent representation on the part of a licensed 
dealer may recover from the dealer's surety. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a full hearing on the merits, the trial court 
granted defendants' Motions To Dismiss the plain-
tiff's Complaint upon the ground that the debt of 
the defendant Kent Moulton had been discharged in 
bankruptcy subsequent to the sale of the trailer and 
that the plaintiff had failed to show that defendant 
Kent Moulton was guilty of any fraud or fraudulent 
representation which was the cause of any loss sus-
tained by the plaintiff which would support a judg-
ment against the bonding company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Mid-Century Insurance Company 
seeks an affirmance of the trial court's granting of 
its Motion To Dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Mid-Century Insurance Company 
agrees with only part of the facts as presented by 
the appellant, and believes that some of the facts 
stated in Appellant's Brief are not facts but are mere 
conclusions or opinions. We, therefore, feel it proper 
to review the evidence upon which the trial court 
based its decision. 
In March of 1967 Clyde Allen, an officer of 
Consolidated Finance Corporation, asked Kent Moul-
ton to go to Pioche, Nevada and to pick up a reposses-
sed trailer (R. 40, 41, 69). Moulton was then doing 
2 
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business as South Davis Camper Sales Company, but 
has since declared bankruptcy. After retrieving the 
trailer Moulton suggested that since he was in the 
business of selling trailers the trailer should be left 
on his lot for sale, and Allen agreed ( R. 69, 70). 
Sometime in May, 1967 the defendant Kent 
Moulton contacted Mr. Allen, whereupon the follow-
mg occurred : 
"Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Sometime toward in May he came down, 
or around the first part of May he came 
down and said he had a sale for the trail-
er, is that correct? 
Well, I would think that he probably call-
ed me on it at that time. I called him inter-
mittentlv concerning the trailer. 
Well then at one time, whether he called 
you by phone or otherwise, he did tell you 
he could sell the trailer? 
Right. 
And he needed the title to the vehicle? 
This is correct. 
And you had the title then in your posses-
sion? 
Right. 
So he came out to Tooele, as I understand 
it, and picked up the title? 
This is memory on how it transacted. I 
was reminded that possibly my brother 
might have taken it up to him on a trip 
up there, but I don't recall it. 
At any rate, at the time you surrendered 
3 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
the title to him he didn't pay you in money 
or give you the $4,700.00 check? 
This is right. 
And so at that time you were simply trust-
ing him with the title to the vehicle on his 
representation that he had a sale for it? 
This is correct. 
And you don't know whether you took the 
title to him or your brother took the title? 
I am sure I didn't go up with it. I don't 
remember exactly how he got it. As I re-
call he said he needed it in a hurry and he 
was going up to Ogden to consummate the 
deal, and I just don't remember. I am 
sure I would have done it the fastest way 
possible. 
Now, the balance shown on your contract 
with Mr. B 1 ant on was $5,963.00, or 
around that sum, and the amount we have 
been talking about is $4, 700.00. Did you 
agree you would let him have the trailer 
for $4,700.00? 
The agreement was he could sell it for 
whatever he wanted. 
THE COURT: For whatever he wanted, 
or could he get? 
THE \VITNESS: For whatever he could 
get, but the price that he arrived at was 
to take care of his trip down to pick the 
traile1· up and net me $4,700.00. 
(By l\fr. Hanson) So f r:om the sale of t~e 
vehicle he was to take his expenses for his 
trip down to get the trailer and then pay 
you $4,700.00? 
4 
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A. Right. 
Q. Now, at the time you surrendered the title 
to him he could have sold the trailer and 
not paid you anything, is that correct? 
A. Well, this is correct. 
Q. I mean, he at that point hail the power to 
dispose of the trailer as he saw fit, and 
you had no security left, is that correct? 
A. This would have been true. 
Q. In effect, what you were doing was trust-
ing him to pay you $4,700.00? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Well, it works out to that. I mean, I didn't 
have any other choice maybe. 
You were anxious to get rid of this trail-
er? 
I was very anxious to close the account 
and get the money, right. 
So at the time you received the check of 
$4,700.00 through the mail on May 26th 
the man already owed you $4,700.00? 
A. This is true. 
Q. You did not part with the title of this ve-
hicle on any theory or any idea that the 
check was either bad or good, did you? 
A. Say that again? 
Q. ·vv ell let's put it this way. You had al-
ready surrendered the title when you re-
ceived the check? 
A. This is right. 
Q. So whether the check was good or bad you 
didn't part with any consideration or any-
5 
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thing at the time you received the $4,700.-
00 checks? 
A. I had already parted with the considera-
tion, this is right. 
Q. You had already turned the title over to 
him? 
A. Already given him the title, right." (R. 
70, 71, 72) 
The defendant Kent Moulton was successful in 
negotiating a sale of the trailer for $5,000.00, al-
though there appears to be some question as to just 
when that sale took place. He testified that the sale 
of the trailer took place in March of 1967, but fur-
ther testified that the sale did not take place until 
after the discussion in May with Mr. Allen, at which 
time Mr. Allen had stated he wanted $4, 700.00 for 
the trailer ( R. 83). He further testified that Clyde 
Allen's brother brought him the title along with the 
other warranty papers at least a month before he 
sold the trailer ( R. 83, 84). Moreover, he testified 
that the trailer sat in his yard prior to his selling it 
for two to three months (R. 41, 80), which would 
make the sale sometime in ]tiay or June of 1967. 
On May 26, 1967 at Moulton's office in Bounti-
ful, Utah Kent Moulton delivered to Clyde Allen a 
check for $4,700.00 (Ex. 2-P, R. 80,81). Kent Moul-
ton testified that "I told Clyde the check wasn't any 
good and he said he needed it to close his books to sat-
isfy his people, and I would make it good as soon as 
I could" (R. 81). That check was returned unpaid, 
6 
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and on June 26, 1967 defendant Kent Moulton for-
warded a second check to Mr. Allen ( R. 65,81). Again 
Mr. Moulton testified that Mr. Allen stated he was 
closing his books and needed something to close his 
books. This check was also returned unpaid (Ex. 6-P, 
R. 65). Thereafter Mr. Moulton continued to make 
payments on the account down to a balance of $2,-
206.60 (R. 68). 
In his business as a camper dealer the defendant 
Moulton maintained a "floor planning" arrangement 
with South Davis Security Bank, which in May of 
1967 fluctuated between $17,000 and $24,000. He 
also had a checking account with the same Bank 
which was maintained separately from the floor plan-
ning arrangement (R. 50). When items which were 
floor planned were sold the money would be put into 
the checking account and then would be transferred 
to pay off loans due under the floor planning ar-
rangement, so that both separate accounts were used 
in financing the operation of defendant Moulton (R. 
49, 50). The Bank would, on occasion, have to 1\"'ait 
for one check to clear before another one could clear, 
and the waiting period was usually limited to three 
or four days before checks would be returned for in-
sufficient funds (R. 54, 56). The checking account 
i·efe1Ted to is the same account on which the two 
checks for $4,700.00 (Ex. 2-P and 6-P) were drawn. 
On May 25, 1967 there was $5,608.18 in the 
checking account; and on part of May 26, 1967 (the 
day on which the first check for $4, 700.00 was 
7 
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drawn) th~re was $8,284.80 on deposit (Ex. 3-P, R. 
48). However, when that check was presented for 
pa:1"ment on June 6, 1967 (R. 54) there were not 
sufficient funds in the Bank (Ex. 4-P) to pay the 
check. ..:'\...gain, on June 26, 1967 (at the time the sec-
ond $4,700.00 check was drawn) there was $5,067.11 
in the checking account. But again when the check 
was p1~esented for payment it was returned for insuf-
ficient funds. 
Based on the foregoing evidence the Court in its 
Memorandum Decision found: 
"l. That it clearly appears to the Court 
that the relationship between the plaintiff and 
Defendant Moulton was one of a seller and 
purchaser. 
"2. That the Def end ant Moulton appar-
ently made some effort to pay the agreed sale 
price reducing the arnount thereof to approxi-
mately half of the agreed amount, the pay-
ments thereon bein; over some period of time. 
"3. That the tLle w~s delivered to the De-
fendant Moulton, fr,~ plaintiff, of course, 
knowing that with t11~ title of possession in 
Moulton that a sale cov ld be made. 
"4. That although th~ Defendant Moul-
ton received the f•1ll :iale price there was no 
clear and convinciP p evidence that there was 
any intention upon the i·art of Moulton to de-
fraud or cheat the plaintiff, which would be 
contradicted by his payin~- half of the sale 
price, and further ty his effiJrts and attempts 
to pay the balance." (R. 30, 31) 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE "?' -~E. 
SENTED UPON WHICH THE TRIAL co:-JRi 
COULD FIND IN FAVOR OF THE BOND fNG 
COMPANY AND AGAINST THE APPELL T 
The plaintiff's main thrust in this action was 
against the Bonding Company. While the theory of 
this case against the defendant Kent Moulton is not 
made clear either from the trial of the action or its 
Brief filed herein, we suppose the plaintiff relied on 
the same claim of fraud to overcome the effect of the 
defendant Moulton's subsequent discharge in bank-
ruptcy as it did in asserting a claim against the bond-
ing company, Mid-Century Insurance Company. 
The sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, on which it apparently relied read in part 
as follows: 
"41-;)-1 fi ... Before any new motor ve-
hicle dAaler's licern;e or used motor vehicle deal-
er's lictnse shall bP- issued by the administra-
tor to any applicant therefor the said applicant 
shall procure ancl file with the administrator 
a good !lnd sufficient bond in the amount of 
$5,000.00 with corporate surety thereon, ... 
and ronditionAd that said applicant shall con·· 
duct his business as a dealer without fraud or 
fraudulent representation, and without the vi-
olation of any of the provisions of this act." 
"41-3-18 ... If any person shall suffer 
any loss or damage by reason of fraud, fraud-
ulent representation or viola~ion of any of the 
provisions of this act by a licensed dealer or 
9 
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one of his salesmen, ... such person shall have 
a right of action against such dealer, and/or 
~lie automobile salesman guilty of the fraud 
fraudulent _r~presenta~ion or violation of any 
of the prov1s1ons of this act, and,/ or the sure-
~: es upon their respective bonds." 
It should be emphasized at the outset thatthe only 
qu(;stion on appeal is whether there was evidence pre-
sented upon which the trial court could find in favor 
cf the bonding company and against the appellant. 
The question is not whether any member of this Court, 
sitting as a trier of fact in this case, would have 
reached the same conclusion the trial court reached, 
(mt whether there is any competent evidence to sup-
lJOrt the conclusion arrived at by that court. This 
Court has stated on numerous occasions that find-
ings of fact made by the trial court will not be dis-
turbed so long as they are supported by substantial 
evidence. Therefore, the findingp. of the lower court 
must be affirmed unless thc~'e -was not reasonablµ 
basis in the evidence on which the court could fairly 
and rationally have thought the requisite proof was 
met. Lowe vs. Rosenlof, 12 l_Ttah 2d 190, 364 P. 2d 
418 ( 1961) ; Child vs. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P. 2d 
981 (1958). 
The foregoing standarrl. for appellate review 
\\;_:s applied in the followjng f1·aud cases, where, as 
ir.. the present case, the trial judge was required to 
make a finding of fact: Lock ~'8. i_,ock, 8 Ariz. App. 
l~>S3, 444 P. 2d 163 (1968); Cullison'l!s. Pride O'Texas 
CJrns Associotion, 88 Ariz. 257, 355 P. 2d 898 
10 
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( 1960); Wright vs. Rogers, 172 Cal 2d 349, 342 P. 
2d 447, 455 (1959); Nalbandia10 '!JS. By;·oit. Jackson 
Pmnps, Inc,, 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P. 2d 681, S86 (1965); 
Prudential Insurance Company vs. Anaya, 78 N.M. 
101, 428 P. 2d 640, 643 ( 1967). 
On page 7 of its Brief the appellant asserts that 
it is undisputed and admitted by the defendant Moul-
ton that he sold the trailer and collected $5,000.00 on 
the sale price in March of 1967 and that he failed to 
disclose this fact to the plaintiff's agent until some 
two months later when he gave them a check for $4,-
700.00. This claim is refuted by the testimony of the 
plaintiff's witness, Clyde J. Allen, who testified that 
he sent Mr. Moulton out in March to get the repos-
sessed trailer (R.69) and that the trailer was in de-
fendant Moulton's possession for prob ab 1 y two 
months before he had a sale for it (R. 41). Mr. Allen 
further testified that v1hen the defendant Moulton 
called him in May relative to getting title to the ve-
hicle, and prior to the time the $4, 700.00 check was 
given, he informed Mr. Allen that he had a sale for 
the trailer (R. 70) but that at that time nothing was 
said about how much Kent Moulton was selling the 
trailer for, only that the plaintiff wanted a net of $4,-
700.00 for the trailer (R. 70, 71, 72). Although Kent 
Moulton did testify at one point that he sold the trail-
er in March of 1967 ( R. 82), he further testified that 
he had the trailer in his possession for two to three 
months prior to selling it (R. 80). He denied that 
he got $5,000.00 for the trailer in March and never 
11 
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paid the plaintiff until May ( R. 82). He further 
testified that he had the title to the trailer (which he 
received from Mr. Allen) at least a month before the 
sale (R. 83) and that he did not conclude the sale un-
til after the discussion with Mr. Allen in which Mr. 
Allen said the finance company wanted $4,700.00 
(R. 84, 85). 
The assertion is further made that defendant 
Moulton delivered a check on May 26, 1967, or short-
ly thereafter, bearing the date of May 26, 1967, at 
a time when he did not have money available in the 
bank to pay the check. The record is that for at least 
a part of the day of May 26, 1967 Moulton had a bal-
ance of $8,284.80 ( R. 48). The record further indi-
cates that in May of 1967, in addition to the checking 
account, defendant Moulton had a financing arrange-
ment with the Bank upon which the check was drawn 
by which he had been extended credit fluctuating be-
tween $17,000 and $24,000 in May of 1967 (R. 49). 
The appellant further makes the assertion on 
page 8 of its Brief that the defendant Moulton was 
guilty of embezzlement as defined by 76-17-5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, which states: 
"Every person intrusted with any prop-
erty as bailee, tenant or lodger, or with any 
power of attorney for the sale or transfer 
thereof, who fraudulently converts the same, 
or the proceeds thereof, to his own use, or se-
cretes it with a fraudulent intent to convert it 
to his own use, is guilty of embezzlement." 
12 
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The fallacy with this argument is that it mis-
construes the arrangement between the plaintiff and 
the defendant Moulton. According to the plaintiff's 
witness, Clyde Allen, the defendant Moulton at the 
time he got the title to the trailer told him that he had 
a sale for the trailer. Nothing was said, according to 
Mr. Allen, about the amount of the sale. The only 
thing that was said was that the plaintiff had to re-
alize $4,700.00 on the trailer. Upon the assumption 
that the defendant Moulton was willing to pay the 
plaintiff $4, 700.00 for the trailer, Mr. Allen parted 
with the title to the trailer. Defendant Moulton was 
at that point free to sell the trailer for whatever sum 
he could realize out of the trailer, be that $5,000.00 
or some other figure. The purport of that agreement, 
as found by the trial court, was that the plaintiff 
agreed to sell the trailer to Kent Moulton for the sum 
of $4, 700.00 and that Moulton was thereafter free to 
resell the trailer for any figure that he might choose. 
The evidence further indicates, as found by the court, 
that the title was delivered to the defendant Moulton, 
the plaintiff knowing that with the title of possession 
in Moulton a sale could be made. 
It has been universally held that 
" ... when dealings between two persons 
create a relation of debtor and creditor, a fail-
ure of one of the parties to pay over money 
does not constitute the crime of embezzle-
ment." 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Embezzlement, Section 
17, at page 567. 
State vs. Clayton, 80 Utah 557, 15 P. 2d 1057 ( 1932); 
13 
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Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea C01npany, 5 Utah 2d 
187, 299 P. 2d 622, 625 (1956); Kelly vs. People, 402 
P. 2d 934, 936 ( 1965). 
In the Clayton case a woman by the name of 
Smith transacted all of her business pertaining to a 
certain parcel of real estate for a period of four or 
five years with a certain real estate company on an 
open or running account, with credits being made for 
moneys received and debits being made for moneys 
paid out. The defendants, who were officers of the 
company during the course of these transactions, had 
received moneys which were to be applied to the pay-
ment of an outstanding mortgage. The company be-
came insolvent and ceased to do business. The defen-
dants were accused of embezzlement on the theory 
that they had used the money which should have been 
applied on the mortgage for other corporate purposes 
and that they had fraudulently converted moneys be-
longing to another. In reversing the lower court con-
victions, this Court pointed out that 
" ... the dealings had by Mrs. Smith with 
the real estate company created but the rela-
tion of debtor and creditor and not one of trust 
in the sense required to constitute an embezzle-
ment or a breach thereof. And, since the mon-
ies held by the real estate company were not 
acquired or held in virtue of such a trust rel.a-
tion no offense of embezzlement was commit-
ted by a failure or neglect to pay the monies 
over. 
"So far as concerns the offense of embez-
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zlement or other crime, the situation is no dif-
ferent. because the company thereafter failed 
m busmess and was unable to meet its obliga-
tion." 15 P. 2d at page 1062. 
The same conclusions were reached in the case 
of Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea Company, supra. In 
that case the defendant was a salesman. It was the 
practice for salemen to collect money on their routes, 
from which they were permitted to deduct items of 
expense (including the amount they had earned as 
salary from the company) as shown by a voucher 
(yellow sheet) which the company furnished them, 
and remit the remainder to the company. They de-
posited the funds in their own bank accounts and re-
mitted to the company by check. It was also shown 
that on prior occasions the defendant had remitted 
checks for different amounts than the exact figures 
owing to the company and that the company had 
made no objection to this procedure. The court said 
that this created a debtor and creditor relationship, 
and went on to say 
"Under the relationship of debtor and 
creditor, rather than agent and principal, in 
which the agent is in possession of particular 
funds belonging to the principal, embezzle-
ment would not lie. The money in question 
would not be 'the property of another' within 
the meaning of our statute." 299 P. 2d ~t page 
625, citing Utah Code Annotated, Sect10n 76-
17 -7 ( 1953) . 
Furthermore, the record is lacking in evidence 
that the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff. 
15 
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He did not fail to disclose to the plaintiff that he had 
a sale for the trailer, nor did he at any time deny that 
he was indebted to the plaintiff for the $4, 700.00 
which he had agreed to pay. There was conflicting 
testimony as to whether Consolidated had ever made 
arrangements with Moulton to pay off the balance 
due in installments. Clyde Allen testified that there 
were no arrangements for credit, but Kent Moulton 
stated that he and Allen had talked about putting the 
remainder on a contract but that nothing was ever 
done about a contract (R. 43, 81). Nevertheless, the 
defendant Moulton did pay and the plaintiff Consol-
idated did in fact accept $2,493.40 from Moulton in 
installment payments on the account, and plaintiff 
cannot in good faith assert otherwise. 
The plaintiff's claim that the defendant Kent 
Moulton perpetrated a fraud upon the plaintiff in 
this case is reduced down to the fact that the defen-
dant Moulton gave the plaintiff two checks for $4,-
700.00 which were returned for insufficient funds. 
This evidence alone is insufficient to prove fraud 
under the bonding statute. 
The case of Phoenix Auto Auction vs. State 
Automobile Insurance, 86 Ariz. 337, 346 P. 2d 146 
( 1959) is directly in point. There a car dealer pur-
chased an automobile at an auction and gave a $1,-
500.00 check for the purchase price, which check was 
returned for insufficient funds. The dealer had pur-
chased 25 or 30 cars before from the auction without 
any problem. Evidence produced at the trial revealed 
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that there were sufficient funds to cover the check 
only on July 25, and the period from August 11 to 
August 15. The Arizona statute under which the ac-
tion was commenced is not worded the same as the 
Utah statute in that an "unlawful act" rather than 
a "fraudulent representation" is required in Ari-
zona. But in evaluating the statute the Arizona court 
made the same inquiry as that made by the trial court 
in the present case, 
"Whether there was an intent to defraud on 
the part of (the dealer)." 346 P. 2d at 148. 
The court held that the dealer did not intend to de-
fraud the seller simply because he drew an insuffi-
cient funds check. 
"Appellant contends that the act of ... 
drawing the $1,500.00 check on July 14, not 
only falls within the definition of 'unlawful 
act' but is sufficient to constitute a criminal 
violation of A.R.S. Section 13-316, 'drawing 
defraud; etc.' It is asserted that the trial court 
could correctly reach only one conclusion from 
the facts as stated. We disagree. The trier of 
fact must needs have decided as a factual ques-
tion, 'was there an intent to defraud?' 
"It is useless to summarize appellant's 
arguments leading to the conclusion that such 
an intent existed. The question is not whether 
any member of this court, sitting as a trier of 
fact in this case, would have reached the same 
conclusion the trial court reached, but whether 
there is any competent evidence to support the 
conclusion arrived at by that court. We hold 
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the record contains evidence to support the 
implied finding of the trial court. 
"The burden of proving an intent to de-
fraud was on the appellant. The trial court 
f rorn the evidence could reasonably conclude 
that appellant had not carried that burden and 
that (defendants) merely breached their con-
tract with appellant, and that therefore (de-
fendants) were liable for the sum of $1',500.-
00; but since there was nothing more than a 
breach of contract, appellee surety was not li-
able under its bond." Id. at 148, 149. 
Plaintiff and appellant cites the case of C01n-
mercial Insurance Conipany of Newark, New Jersey 
vs. Watson, 261 F. 2d 143 (10 Cir.). An analysis of 
the facts in that case as set out in the plaintiff's 
Brief on page 10 will show that the course of conduct 
complained of on the part of the dealer in that case 
went far beyond simply writing a check for insuffi-
cient funds to pay an obligation which was admitted-
ly owing. In that case the dealer, Powell, represented 
to Import, a wholesale dealer in foreign automobiles, 
that he had a sale for a Volkswagen and induced Im-
port to give him possession of it and to deposit the 
title papers in the Los Alamos branch of a Santa Fe 
Bank with a sight draft for the purchase price in the 
sum of $1,625.00. The title papers so deposited con-
sisted of an assignment from the original nonresi-
dent owner by power of attorney to Import's Man-
ager, and a reassignment of title by registered dealer 
from Import to Powell's Downtown Auto Sales at 
Santa Fe. When the sight draft was not paid, Powell 
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instructed Import to draw another draft for the 
amount of the purchase price, with title attached, on 
another bank where he usually did business, and 
through which he would "floor-plan" the car. Import 
finally instructed the bank to release title to Powell 
without payment of the draft, but to return the at-
tached power of attorney. In a subsequent telephone 
conversation, Import complained of nonreceipt of 
payment and Powell professed not to understand why 
payment had not been made by the bank, and said 
that he would go to the bank and see what was up. 
Several days later, Powell sold the automobile and 
delivered the certificate of title and a bill of sale. The 
purchaser of the automobile from Powell was unable 
to secure transfer of the title because of the absence 
of the power of attorney from the original owner. 
Import then delivered the power of attorney to clear 
the title and took an assignment of the purchaser's 
claim against Powell. 
As stated by the court in its opinion, Powell was 
guilty of fraud in a number of respects, 
'
1
' ••• in obtaining possession of the auto-
mobile and then title for the ostensible purpose 
of 'floor-planning' the car at a bank, when con-
sidered in the light of his later professions not 
to know why payment had not been made by 
the bank though he had not negotiated the 
agreed fi~ancing, certainly i~dicate a~ intent 
to defraud his seller. Indeed, it was qmte suf-
ficient to justify the court's finding of fraud-
ulent conduct." 261 F. 2d at 445. 
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Although it is not pointed out in the opinion, it 
further appears that Powell sold the car to a pur-
chaser even though at the time he was unable to de-
liver title to the automobile and that Import subse-
quently delivered the power of attorney to clear the 
title and took an assignment of the purchaser's claim. 
It is noteworthy that nothing is said in the entire 
case about issuing a check against insufficient funds. 
The Utah Bonding Statute was intended to as-
sure against losses based on fraud, fraudulent misrep-
resentations or violation of the motor vehicle stat-
utes. It was not, however, intended to guarantee that 
an automobile dealer would pay his debts or simply 
to protect the creditors of an automobile dealer. De-
spite appellant's insistence that the drawing of a 
check on insufficient funds should constitute a per se 
violation of the Bonding Statute, no authority for 
such an assertion is cited, and such assertion is di-
rectly opposed to the laws of this state and other jur-
isdictions. The trial court's findings in this case are, 
in our opinion, supported by the preponderance of 
the evidence. At least, there is no evidence from 
which it should be held that the trial judge was com-
pelled to find otherwise. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PR 0 PERL Y FOUND 
THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF 
FRAUD 
In the second point of its argument the plain· 
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tiff and appellant makes the assertion that the trial 
court misconceived the nature of the fraud required 
to support a judgment for the plaintiff. Such an as-
sertion proceeds on the premise that the plaintiff sus-
tained his burden of proof that the defendant Moul-
ton was guilty of fraud, however plaintiff and ap-
pellant may define that term, which the defendants 
and respondents deny as pointed out in the argument 
in the foregoing part of this Brief. Plaintiff and ap-
pellant then set out some general definitions of the 
term ''fraud," with which we do not disagree. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Lawrence vs. Ward, 
5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P. 2d 619. In that case the fraud-
ulent acts complained of, in the language of the court, 
arose out of two transactions. In the first, 
"Ward, being in financial difficulty, sold 
a 1954 Cadillac and delivered title to the buyer. 
He then represented himself to the agent of 
the bank as the owner and mortgaged the car, 
receiving a check for $2500, which was cashed 
and collected. He was unable to pay the promis-
sory note and the bank claims that its loss was 
occasioned by the fraudulent representations 
of a licensed dealer and should be recoverable 
against his bond." 5 Utah 2d at 261. 
The court agreed in this instance, and also in the sec-
ond instance where 
·"One Dalton purchased a 1954 Ch~vrolet 
from United Auto Sales and executed his note 
to the Sandy City Bank. A check! :payable to 
Dalton and United Auto Sales JOmtly, was 
sent to the company by the bank and later cash-
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ed and collected. vVhen the company was un-
able to deliver title, Dalton refused to pay on 
the note because his endorsement on the ·check 
was a forgery. The trial court gave judgment 
for the bank against Ward and Selleneit since 
they had received the proceeds of the check. A 
forgery likewise falls within the protection of 
the bond and it is immaterial that the bank 
carried insurance against forgery." Id at 262. 
As can be seen in these two cases, the fraudulent 
or unlawful acts of the dealer consisted of represent-
ing himself to be the owner of an automobile which 
he did not own and which he had already sold, and 
in receiving the proceeds of a forged check. The facts 
of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts 
of the case at hand. Defendant Moulton in this case 
made no misrepresentations to the plaintiff. He simp-
ly obtained title to the trailer by promising to pay 
the sum of $4,700.00 to the plaintiff. The evidence 
indicates that at the time he clearly intended to live 
up to that promise. In the course of attempting to live 
up to that promise he did give the plaintiff checks 
which proved to be drawn against insufficient funds. 
These checks, it should be noted, were not given at 
the time title was turned over to the defendant Moul-
ton. As indicated by the appellant's own witness, the 
plaintiff simply trusted the defendant Moulton to 
pay the $4,700.00. 
The court did define the plaintiff's burden of 
proof in the Lmcrence case, supra, saying on page 
261 of the Utah Reports 
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" ... plaintiff must prove a material, false 
representation, an intention that the represen-
tation should be acted on in the manner con-
templated; the hearer's ignorance of the falsi-
ty of the statement, his reliance upon it, his 
right to rely and his proximate injury ... " 
Plaintiff cites the Arizona case of Comme1-c:ial 
Standard Insurance Co. vs. West, 7 4 Ariz. 359, 249 
P. 2d 830. This case was cited in the case of Lawrence 
vs Ward in support of the court's holding in Law-
rence vs. Ward that the mortgagee who recovered 
judgment against a dealer for fraud was also entitled 
to judgment against the bonding company. The facts 
indicate that the plaintiff, a licensed dealer, sold two 
cars to buyers who signed Conditional Sales Con-
tracts as ''purchasers." The plain tiff did not sign as 
the "seller," although he was the true owner. The 
plaintiff delivered the Sales Contracts to the defen-
dant, also a licensed dealer, who signed them as "sel-
ler." The defendant then assigned the contracts to a 
bank and collected the proceeds, which he converted. 
The trial court found that the defendant had violated 
the provisions of the Arizona bonding statute in that 
he had engaged in an "unlawful act" by converting 
the money. The trial court, sitting without a jury, 
found that the defendant had fraudulently converted 
the plaintiff's money, and the bonding company ap-
pealed. 
The defendant's "unlawful act" was not ques-
tioned on appeal, and the only issue was whether the 
defendant was acting as a "dealer" as required by 
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the statute. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's findings, pointing out that the stat-
ute was broad enough to cover all unlawfull activities 
engaged in by a licensed dealer. Although the court 
did not go into detail as to how the defendant had con-
verted the money, it appears that his fraudulent con-
duct was more or less unquestioned. Apparently there 
was no evidence that the defendant attempted to pay 
back any of the money or that he exercised any good 
faith in the transaction. 
Likewise the case cited by the plaintiff of State 
ex rel MacNaughton vs. New A1nsterdam Cas. Co., 
1 Wis. 2d 494, 85 N.W. 2d 337 is not in point. In that 
case, as pointed out by the plaintiff's Brief, a custo-
mer of a used car lot left his automobile to be sold. 
The dealer, without his knowledge or consent, mort-
gaged the car to a finance company and subsequently 
sold the car after a bond covering the operation ex-
pired. There appeared to be no contest that the action 
of the dealer in mortgaging the car which he did not 
own was fraudulent. The defense proceeded on the 
ground that the innocent purchaser of the automobile 
did not sustain a loss until the sale of the automobile, 
which was after the bond of the dealer had expired. 
By relying on cases in which the trial court's 
findings of fraud were affirmed, the appellant re-
veals its failure to properly characterize the issue on 
appeal. Indeed, the appellant has overlooked numer-
ous cases, including the Phoenix Auto Auction case, 
supra, wh'ich are directly in point and which may be 
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relied upon as holding directly against its position 
in the present appeal. In Butte Motor Company vs. 
Strand, 225 Ore. 317, 358 P. 2d 279 ( 1960), the 
plaintiff, a dealer engaged in the automobile business 
in Butte, Montana, brought cars to be sold on the de-
fendant's used car lot in Salem, Oregon. The defen-
dant sold the cars and gave the plaintiff two checks, 
both of wllich were returned for insufficient funds. 
Moreover, the defendant never did pay for the cars 
but used the proceeds for other purposes because he 
was in financial difficulty. The Oregon bonding stat-
ute is worded so that the dealers are required to "con-
duct (their) business as a dealer without fraud or 
fraudulent representation and without violating any 
of the provisions of this chapter." 358 P. 2d at 280, 
citing 0.R.S. Section 481.310. The plaintiff based his 
claims solely on the theory that the defendant's con-
duct in failing to pay for the cars when they were 
sold amounted to fraud as that term is used in the 
statute. 
The court expressly rejected this argument and 
held the defendant not liable, pointing out that the 
failure to perform a promise relating to future action 
or conduct does not constitute fraud within the mean-
ing of the bonding statute. The court also emphasized 
that the promise to pay was not made in bad faith and 
that the findings of the trial court could not be dis-
turbed as long as they were "supported by substan-
tial evidence." 358 P. 2d at 281. 
In Warner Motor Company vs. Strand, 225 Ore. 
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315, 358 P. 2d 282 ( 1960), a companion case to Butte, 
supra, an owner delivered his car to the dealer for 
sale. By agreement, the car was traded for four older 
models which were sold, but the owner of the original 
car received proceeds from only one of the four sales. 
The court held that there was no fraud or violation 
of the bonding statute on the grounds that the case 
was controlled by the opinion in the Butte case, supra. 
The case of Sterner vs. Lehnianowsky, 173 Neb. 
401, 113 N.W. 2d 588 ( 1962) is also in point. In that 
case two causes of action were brought by a small 
loan company against a car dealer. In the first cause 
of action the loan company gave the dealer a note, 
mortgage and certificate of title to repossess a car 
which had been purchased through the dealer. The 
dealer collected the amount due on the mortgage but 
did not remit it to the loan company. In the second 
cause of action the dealer was accused of ( 1) failing 
to return a repossessed car and ( 2) refusing to de-
liver insurance proceeds from a damaged vehicle. The 
trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the 
bonding company, and the plaintiff appealed. The 
Nebraska bonding statute provided that " ... the 
licensed dealer will fully indemnify any person by 
reason of any loss suffered because of ... ( e) any 
false and fraudulent representations or deceitful 
practices whatever in representing any motor ve-
hicle ... " 113 N.W. 2d 592, citing Section 60-619, 
R.R.S. ( 1943). 
The court held that the plaintiff's evidence fail-
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ed to show willful fraud as required by the bonding 
statute: 
~'We agree the bond does protect against 
willful fraud, but willful fraud is not proved 
by the mere failure to keep a promise or to pay 
a debt ... We do not believe Lehmanowsky's 
failure to keep his promise to turn over the 
proceeds is a misappropriation within the 
terms of the bond in this record." Id. at 595. 
In the present appeal the defendant Kent Moul-
ton purchased a vehicle from Consolidated Finance 
Company for $4, 700.00, which was later sold for $5,-
000.00. Because he was in financial difficulty, de-
fendant Moulton was not able to pay the $4,700.00 in 
a lump sum, but he later, however, attempted to pay 
back the amount owed and did, in fact, remit $2,-
493.40. In light of this evidence the trial court prop-
erly found that defendant Moulton did not intend to 
defraud Consolidated Finance Company, even though 
checks which he issued were returned for insufficient 
funds. The trial court found that because defendant 
Moulton attempted to pay for the trailer in subse-
quent installments Consolidated had failed in its at-
tempt to produce clear and convincing evidence of 
fraud. The trial court's findings are substantiated by 
competent evidence from the record, and it is respect-
fully submitted that these findings should be affirm-
ed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court in this case found that the defen-
dant Moulton in effect purchased a trailer from the 
plaintiff, Consolidated Finance Company, for the 
sum of $4, 700.00, and upon his promise to pay said 
sum secured title to the trailer which he then sold to 
another purchaser. He thereafter paid the plaintiff 
some $2,493.40 of the agreed purchase price, leaving 
a balance owing to the plaintiff of $2,206.60. During 
the course of paying said obligation the defendant 
Moulton gave the plaintiff two checks in the amount 
of $4,700.00 which were not honored because of in-
sufficient funds, although the evidence indicates that 
at least at some time there were sufficient funds in 
the bank upon which they were drawn to pay said 
checks had they been presented at that time. At the 
time the title to the trailer was delivered to the de-
fendant Moulton, the plaintiff knew that defendant 
Moulton needed the title so that he could resell the 
trailer, which he subsequently did. In others words, 
he in no way misrepresentated his intentions. The 
plaintiff claims that the trial court's findings were 
not supported by the evidence or that they in and of 
themselves constitute evidence of fraud sufficient to 
entitle it to a judgment against the defendant Kent 
Moulton, who has subsequently taken out bankruptcy, 
and his bonding company. It is submitted that the 
court's findings were supported by sufficient compe-
tent evidence and that the plaintiff failed in its bur-
den to show fraud on the part of the defendant Kent 
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Moulton upon which a judgment against the defen-
dants and respondents in this case can be based. It is 
respectfully submitted, therefore, that the decision 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON J. HANSON of 
HANSON & GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent Mid-
Century Insurance Co. 
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